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Quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the laws of quantum physics allows the secure distri-
bution of secret keys over an insecure channel. Unfortunately, imperfect implementations of QKD
compromise its information-theoretical security. Measurement-device-independent quantum key dis-
tribution (MDI-QKD) is a promising approach to remove all side channels from the measurement
unit, which is regarded as the “Achilles’ heel” of QKD. An essential assumption in MDI-QKD is
however that the sources are trusted. Here we experimentally demonstrate that a practical source
based on a semiconductor laser diode is vulnerable to a laser seeding attack, in which light injected
from the communication line into the laser results in an increase of the intensities of the prepared
states. The unnoticed increase of intensity may compromise the security of QKD, as we show the-
oretically for the prepare-and-measure decoy-state BB84 and MDI-QKD protocols. Our theoretical
security analysis is general and can be applied to any vulnerability that increases the intensity of
the emitted pulses. Moreover, a laser seeding attack might be launched as well against decoy-state
based quantum cryptographic protocols beyond QKD.
I. INTRODUCTION
The distribution of a secret key between two autho-
rized parties, Alice and Bob, is a fundamental but chal-
lenging cryptographic task. Such secret key is the essen-
tial resource of the one-time-pad algorithm [1], the only
known encryption method that can offer unconditionally
secure communications. Public-key cryptography solves
this problem by resorting to computational assumptions,
for instance, the difficulty of factoring large numbers [2].
This approach is however vulnerable to technological ad-
vances in both hardware and software; indeed, it is well-
known that factoring is an easy problem on a quantum
computer [3]. Quantum key distribution (QKD), on the
other hand, provides a solution based on the laws of
quantum physics, and thus, in theory, it can guarantee
that the distributed keys are information-theoretically se-
cure [4–6].
There is however a big gap between the theory and
the practice of QKD because the behaviour of real QKD
devices typically deviates from that considered in the se-
curity proofs. Such deviation could be exploited by an
eavesdropper, Eve, to obtain information about the se-
cret key without being detected in QKD implementa-
tions [7–27]. Most of the quantum hacking attacks re-
alized so far exploit imperfections of the single-photon
detectors (SPDs) – the “Achilles’ heel” of QKD [7–
∗ angelhuang.hn@gmail.com
15, 18–20, 22]. Indeed, in recent years there has been
an enormous effort to try to close the detectors’ se-
curity loopholes and restore the security of QKD real-
izations. Some solutions are based on hardware and
software patches [28, 29], whose drawback is however
that each patch typically protects only against a spe-
cific loophole, i.e., the system might still be vulnera-
ble to unknown attacks. Moreover, patches might also
be hacked [20, 22]. A safer and more elegant solution
is that of measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-
QKD) [30, 31]. Remarkably, this latter approach guaran-
tees security independently of the behaviour of the mea-
surement device, which can be treated as a “black box”
fully controlled by Eve. This is achieved by turning Bob’s
receiver into a transmitter by means of a time-reversed
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) protocol [32, 33]. MDI-
QKD has been successfully demonstrated in several re-
cent experiments [34–39] including an implementation
over 404 km [40].
With the advent of MDI-QKD all security loopholes
from the measurement unit are closed, so the focus is
now on how to protect the QKD transmitters. For in-
stance, decoy-state QKD [41–43] is a practical solution to
defeat the photon-number-splitting attack [44, 45]. More
recently, several works have considered other imperfec-
tions of the transmitter, and new security proofs that
guarantee security in the presence of such imperfections
have been developed [46–53]. For example, Refs. [48–50]
quantify the optical isolation that is needed in order to
achieve a certain performance (i.e., a certain secret key
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2rate over a given distance) in the presence of a Trojan-
horse attack (THA), in which Eve injects bright light into
the transmitter and then analyses the back-reflected light
to obtain information about the quantum signals emit-
ted. Finally, a type of light injection attack that affects
the operation of the laser diode in the transmitter has
recently been introduced, allowing Eve to actively de-
randomise the source’s phase and even change other pa-
rameters [54]. Indeed, the use of non-phase-randomised
signals has a severe effect on the security of QKD, as has
been shown in the past decade [55–58].
While the results above are promising, there is still a
long way to go to be able to ensure the security of QKD
implementations. For instance, a fundamental assump-
tion of QKD is that the intensity of the quantum states
prepared by Alice is set at a single-photon level. This
assumption is indeed vital for a QKD system. However,
no study has investigated whether or not Eve could in-
crease the mean photon number of the prepared states.
Here we introduce, and experimentally demonstrate, a
quantum hacking attack, which we call “laser seeding at-
tack”, that can increase and control the intensity of the
light emitted by the laser diode in the transmitter of a
QKD system. This attack has been confirmed experi-
mentally for two types of laser diodes. Different from
the THA that analyses the back-reflected light that is
originally from an external independent source, the laser
seeding attack manipulates the functioning of the trans-
mitter’s laser diode directly. That is, while in a THA
Eve tries to correlate her signals with the quantum states
prepared by the legitimate users of the system, in a laser
seeding attack the goal of Eve is to directly increase the
intensity of such quantum states. Most importantly, this
attack seriously compromises the security of decoy-state
based QKD, which includes MDI-QKD with practical
light sources as a prominent example. More precisely,
in the presence of this attack, current security analyses
overestimate the resulting secret key rate and thus they
do not guarantee security.
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
To investigate to which extent Eve can increase the
output optical power of a laser diode by injecting light
into it, we conduct an experiment whose schematic is il-
lustrated in Fig. 1. On Alice’s side, the laser diode, as
a testing target, generates optical pulses. As a hacker,
Eve employs a tunable laser (Agilent 8164B) to send
continuous-wave (c.w.) bright light to Alice’s laser diode
via a single-mode optical fibre. The tunable laser is able
to adjust the wavelength and output power of the signals
emitted so that Eve can inject photons with a proper
wavelength into Alice’s laser. In so doing, the energy of
each injected photon can match the energy difference be-
tween the excited state and the ground state of the laser,
and thus satisfy the condition for stimulated emission.
In order to maximize the injection efficiency, a polar-
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FIG. 1. Experimental setup. The red solid arrows repre-
sent Eve’s injected continuous-wave (c.w.) bright light, and
the blue dashed arrows indicate the optical pulses emitted by
Alice’ laser diode. PG: electronic pulse generator; LD: laser
diode; PC: polarization controller.
ization controller is used to adjust the polarization of
Eve’s laser such that it matches that of Alice’s laser.
To separate Eve’s injected light from that emitted by
Alice, we employ an optical circulator. Eve’s light en-
ters port 1 of the circulator and exits through its port 2,
while Alice’s light goes from port 2 of the circulator to
its port 3 (see Fig. 1). We record Alice’s output pulses
with an optical-to-electrical converter with 40 GHz band-
width (Picometrix PT-40A) that is connected to a high-
speed oscilloscope (Agilent DSOX93304Q) of 33 GHz
bandwidth. The average pulse energy is then calcu-
lated by integrating the recorded averaged waveform. A
cross-check using an optical power meter has confirmed
that this method is accurate. We observe the energy
of Alice’s laser pulses with and without Eve’s tamper-
ing laser. We have tested two ID300 short-pulse laser
sources from ID Quantique and one LP1550-SAD2 laser
diode (LD) from Thorlabs. They are triggered by an
external signal. ID300 contains a factory pre-set pulsed
driver electronics and produces 50–70 ps full width at half
maximum (FWHM) optical pulses, with their repetition
rate controlled by our external electronic pulse generator
(PG; Picosecond 12050). LP1550-SAD2’s diode current
is driven directly from the PG with pulse parameters set
to obtain about 60 ps FWHM optical pulses from the
LD. The pulse repetition rate for all samples is 1 MHz.
The electronic pulse generator also acts as the external
trigger of the oscilloscope as shown in Fig. 1.
III. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Both samples of ID300 exhibit controllability of their
output power by Eve. We first measure the center wave-
length of each laser with a spectrum analyser (Yoko-
gawa AQ6370D). Then, in the experimental setup shown
in Fig. 1, we dial the value of Alice’s wavelength in Eve’s
laser. As a result, the output power of Alice’s pulse sud-
denly increases. To obtain the maximum output power
under Eve’s control, we finely tune Eve’s wavelength until
the largest energy rise is observed, which is 1550.15 nm
for sample 1 and 1550.44 nm for sample 2. This is
the case we focus on. Additionally, we have noted that
slightly different seed wavelengths result in different pulse
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FIG. 2. Averaged waveforms of laser pulses measured from (a) ID300 sample 1, (b) ID300 sample 2, and (c) the laser diode
LP1550-SAD2 from Thorlabs. Each oscillogram is an average over 2000 pulses.
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FIG. 3. Average energy of Alice’s output pulses as a function
of Eve’s tampering power for two samples of the laser ID300
from ID Quantique (black curves) and the laser diode LP1550-
SAD2 from Thorlabs (red curve). The energy of the pulse
increases up to 3.07 times for ID300 sample 1, 4.57 times for
ID300 sample 2, and 1.13 times for Thorlabs LP1550-SAD2.
shapes as shown in Appendix A.
When we gradually increase the power of Eve’s c.w.
laser, the energy of Alice’s emitted pulses also increases.
This is shown in Fig. 2 (a) and (b), which illustrates the
waveforms of Alice’s pulses for various tampering light
powers. If we compare these results with the original
waveform of Alice’s pulses (i.e., that in the absence of
Eve’s tampering laser), there are two main effects. First,
as already mentioned, we see that the energy of the emit-
ted optical pulses gets larger when we increase the tam-
pering light power. Especially, Eve’s injected light makes
Alice’s laser pulses wider with a much longer and higher
tail as shown in Fig. 2 (a) and (b). The tail contains
more energy when higher power is injected into the diode.
Second, under the laser seeding attack, the main peak of
Alice’s pulse shifts to be earlier. This is because the in-
jected light triggers the stimulated emission that happens
quicker than the spontaneous emission in Alice’s laser
diode. Thus, Alice’s pulse reaches the peak power earlier
and is followed by a tail with 2–4 secondary oscillations
under the attack.
We have measured the energy of Alice’s pulses for dif-
ferent tampering light powers. The results are shown
in Fig. 3 as black curves. In particular, we find that when
there is no attack, this energy is 0.232 pJ (0.169 pJ) for
sample 1 (2). Then, we gradually increase the power of
Eve’s c.w. laser up to 9 mW, and obtain that the out-
put energy of Alice’s laser rises up to 0.712 pJ (0.773 pJ)
for sample 1 (2). That is, the pulse energy increases
3.07 (4.57) times for sample 1 (2).
Under the same experimental procedure done with
ID300, a similar effect is observed in the laser LP1550-
SAD2. The wavelength of the injected c.w. light is set
to the center wavelength of the laser diode first, then
tuned slightly to 1551.32 nm where we observe the maxi-
mum increase in Alice’s pulse energy. Figure 2 (c) shows
the waveforms of Alice’s pulses for the same tampering
light powers as those in Fig. 2 (a) and (b). Similarly to
ID300 lasers, here the energy of the pulses increases with
the tampering power as well. The rising edge of Alice’s
pulse also starts earlier in the presence of the attack. The
increase of the pulse energy as a function of Eve’s tam-
pering power is shown in Fig. 3 as a red curve. If there
is no attack, the average energy of Alice’s laser pulses is
0.196 pJ, while it reaches 0.221 pJ when the tampering
power is 9 mW. That is, in this case the pulse energy
increases 1.13 times.
We note that the commercial lasers under test in our
experiment (ID300 and LP1550-SAD2) contain an inter-
nal optical isolator of the order of 30–40 dB. Thus, a
few mW light that is applied in our experiment is first
attenuated at the internal isolator of the laser, which
means that only about 100 nW power actually reaches
the laser cavity. This analysis indicates that an injection
power in the order of 100 nW could be enough to con-
trol the intensity of Alice’s pulses. Indeed, this value of
injection power has been also confirmed recently by the
experimental results shown in Ref. [59], in which Eve’s
4injection power is in 100–160 nW range. We also note
that a real QKD system may use a laser diode without
the internal isolator, then the injection power used in our
laser seeding attack may be reduced to the above level.
IV. EFFECT ON THE SECURITY OF QKD
Now we show theoretically how an unnoticed increase
of the optical power emitted by a QKD transmitter, due
to the attack described above, could seriously compro-
mise the security of a QKD implementation. We assume
that Alice’s photon number statistics is Poissonian and
is not influenced by our attack. The former may not nec-
essarily be the case [60], and investigating the validity
of the latter assumption could be the topic of a future
study. Based on this assumption, we shall consider the
case of decoy-state based QKD [41–43], which includes
the most implemented QKD schemes today. We refer
the reader to Appendix B for further details about decoy-
state based QKD. For simplicity, in our analysis we shall
assume the asymptotic scenario where Alice sends Bob
an infinite number of pulses, i.e., we disregard statistical
fluctuations due to finite size effects. Also, motivated by
the experimental results presented in the previous sec-
tion, we shall consider that Eve’s attack increases all the
intensities µ by the same factor κ > 1. That is, we will
assume that µ′ = κµ for all µ.
Next, we quantitatively evaluate the effect that a laser
seeding attack has on the security of the standard decoy-
state BB84 protocol and of MDI-QKD for a typical chan-
nel model. For concreteness, we will consider first the
case of the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol with
phase-randomized weak coherent pulses (WCPs); after-
ward, we will consider the case of MDI-QKD.
A. Standard decoy-state BB84 protocol
Regarding the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol, we
evaluate the typical implementation where Alice and Bob
use three different intensities, µs, ν1 and ν2 that satisfy
µs > ν1 > ν2, and they generate secret key only from
those events where they employ the signal intensity µs
in the Z basis, while they use the X basis events for pa-
rameter estimation. In the asymptotic limit of an infinite
number of transmitted signals, the secret key rate can be
lower bounded by [61, 62]
RL = p
µs
1 Y
Z
1,L[1−H2(eX1,U )]− feGµsZ H2(EµsZ ), (1)
where we assume the efficient version of this protocol [63].
In Eq. (1), Y Z1,L (e
X
1,U ) denotes a lower (upper) bound on
the single-photon yield Y Z1 (phase error rate e
X
1 ), the
parameter fe is the error correction efficiency, G
µs
Z (E
µs
Z )
represents the overall experimentally observed gain (the
overall experimentally observed QBER) when Alice send
to Bob a WCP of intensity µs in the Z basis, andH2(x) =
−x log2 (x) − (1 − x) log2 (1− x) is the binary Shannon
entropy function.
To estimate Y Z1,L and e
X
1,U one can use analytical or
numerical tools. Here we use the analytical method pro-
posed in Ref. [61]. In particular, we have that
Y Z1,L ≥
µs
µs(ν1 − ν2)− ν21 + ν22
[
Gν1Z e
ν1 −
Gν2Z e
ν2 − ν
2
1 − ν22
µ2s
(GµsZ e
µs − Y Z0,L)
]
, (2)
eX1,U ≤
Eν1X G
ν1
X e
ν1 − Eν2X Gν2X eν2
(ν1 − ν2)Y X1,L
, (3)
with Y Z0,L being a lower bound on Y
Z
0 given by
Y Z0,L ≥
ν1G
ν2
Z e
ν2 − ν2Gν1Z eν1
ν1 − ν2 , (4)
and where the parameter Y X1,L represents a lower bound
on Y X1 . This last quantity can be obtained by using
Eq. (2) but now referred to the X basis.
In the presence of a laser seeding attack, Alice and
Bob estimate Y Z1,L and e
X
1,U using Eqs. (2) and (3) but
now with the experimentally observed quantities Gµ
′
α and
Eµ
′
α , with α ∈ {Z,X}, µ′ = κµ and µ ∈ {µs, ν1, ν2} for a
certain κ that depends on the attack.
In our analysis we shall also evaluate an ultimate upper
bound on the secret key rate. That is, this upper bound
holds for any possible post-processing method that Alice
and Bob could apply to their raw data. The only as-
sumption here is that double click events are randomly
assigned to single click events. For this, we use the tech-
nique introduced in Ref. [64]. More precisely, the upper
bound on the key rate is given by
RU ≤
∑
n≥1
rn(1− λnBSA)Ientn (A;B), (5)
where rn ≈ e−µsµns /n! is the probability that Alice sends
Bob an n-photon state with the signal intensity, λnBSA is
the maximum weight of separability among all the bipar-
tite quantum states σnAB that are compatible with Alice
and Bob’s observables, and Ientn (A;B) is the Shannon
mutual information evaluated on the entanglement part
of the state σnAB that has the maximum weight of separa-
bility. See Ref. [64] and Appendix C for further details.
For simulation purposes we use the experimental pa-
rameters listed in Table I. The resulting lower and upper
bounds on the secret key rate are shown in Fig. 4. The
blue dotted line represents the lower bound RL given by
Eq. (1) in the absence of the attack. Here, for each given
value of the distance, we select the optimal values of the
intensities µs, ν1 and ν2 that maximize RL. These op-
timized intensities are then fixed, and we use them to
simulate the degradation of the security bounds due to
Eve’s laser seeding attack.
More precisely, the red solid line in Fig. 4 shows the
value of RL that Alice and Bob would estimate in the
5TABLE I. Experimental parameters used in the simulations.
The background rate and detection efficiency of the SPDs are
taken from Ref. [38].
Channel loss coefficient (dB/km) α 0.2
Background rate Y0 2.6× 10−5
Total misalignment error ed 1.5%
Detection efficiency of the SPDs ηD 30%
Error correction efficiency fe 1.12
Distance (km)
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
K
ey
 ra
te
RLwithout attack ( =1)
Incorrect RLestimated with attack ( =2)
CorrectRL with attack ( =2)
RU with attack ( =2)
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
FIG. 4. Lower (RL) and upper (RU ) bounds on the secret key
rate as a function of the distance for the standard decoy-state
BB84 protocol for two different values of the multiplicative
factor κ = {1, 2}. The original intensity settings have been
optimized previously for each distance. The parameters used
in the simulations are given in Table I.
presence of the attack when κ = 2. That is, as explained
above, here Alice and Bob estimate the parameters Y Z1,L
and eX1,U with the observed quantities G
µ′
α and E
µ′
α , with
α ∈ {Z,X}, µ′ = κµ and µ ∈ {µs, ν1, ν2}, together with
the original intensities µs, ν1 and ν2. The red dash-
dotted line, on the other hand, illustrates the correct
secure value of RL in the presence of the attack. That
is, here Y Z1,L and e
X
1,U are estimated with the observed
quantities Gµ
′
α and E
µ′
α , with α ∈ {Z,X}, µ′ = κµ and
µ ∈ {µs, ν1, ν2}, together with the modified intensities
µ′.
As we can see in Fig. 4, the secure RL given by the red
dash-dotted line is significantly below the RL actually
estimated by Alice and Bob. That is, in the presence of
the attack, the security proof introduced in Refs. [61, 62]
cannot guarantee the security of the secret key obtained
by Alice and Bob. Finally, the red dashed line illustrates
the upper bound RU given by Eq. (5) in the presence of
the attack. Remarkably, this upper bound is below the
RL estimated by Alice and Bob for most of the distances,
1 1.5 2 2.510
−3
10−2etar yeK
Incorrect RL estimated with attack
Correct RL with attack
RU with attack
FIG. 5. Lower (RL) and upper (RU ) bounds on the secret key
rate as a function of the parameter κ for a fixed distance (40
km in this case), for decoy-state BB84 protocol. In these sim-
ulations, the original intensity settings have been optimized
previously for the distance of 40 km assuming no attack. The
parameters used in the simulations are given in Table I.
which demonstrates that the estimated secret key rate is
actually insecure no matter what security proof is used.
Finally, in Fig. 5 we show the effect that the multiplica-
tive factor κ has on the bounds on the secret key rate.
For this, we now fix the transmission distance at a cer-
tain value, say 40 km. In this case, Fig. 5 shows that the
incorrect lower bound RL that Alice and Bob would es-
timate is always above its correct value whenever κ > 1.
This is remarkable because it means that in the presence
of a laser seeding attack Alice and Bob always overes-
timate their secret key rate above that provided by the
security proof. Moreover, if κ is large enough (around
1.7 for the experimental parameters used in Fig. 5), it
turns out that the upper bound RU is below the esti-
mated secret key rate, which confirms that there is no
security proof which can make the estimated secret key
rate secure.
We remark that in practice Eve might need to throt-
tle the key rate to roughly the original expected level
in the absence of the attack. Indeed a human operator
of QKD equipment may suspect something abnormal is
happening on if the key generation rate rises well above
the expected level (blue dotted line in Fig. 4). To reduce
the rate, Eve can simply introduce additional optical at-
tenuation in the channel.
B. MDI-QKD
Next we consider the case of MDI-QKD with
WCPs [30]. Similar to the previous example, we shall
assume that each of Alice and Bob use three different
intensities, µs, ν1 and ν2 that satisfy µs > ν1 > ν2, and
6they generate secret key from those events encoded with
the signal intensity in the Z basis, while they use the X
basis events for parameter estimation. In the asymptotic
limit of an infinite number of transmitted signals (and
assuming for simplicity a sifting factor ≈ 1), the secret
key rate is lower bounded by [30]
RL = p
µsµs
11 Y
Z
11,L[1−H2(eX11,U )]− feGµsµsZ H2(EµsµsZ ),(6)
where pµsµs11 is the probability that both Alice and Bob
emit a single-photon pulse in the Z basis when they both
use the signal intensity setting µs, Y
Z
11,L is a lower bound
on the yield associated to these single-photon events,
eX11,U is an upper bound on the phase error rate of these
single-photon pulses, fe is again the error correction ef-
ficiency, GµsµsZ and E
µsµs
Z are the gain and the QBER
when both Alice and Bob send to the relay Charles WCPs
of intensity µs in the Z basis, and H2(x) is the binary
Shannon entropy function defined previously.
To evaluate Eq. (6), Alice and Bob need to calculate
the parameters Y Z11,L and e
X
11,U based on the experimen-
tally available data Gζωα and E
ζω
α , with α ∈ {Z,X} and
ζ, ω ∈ {µs, ν1, ν2}, and their knowledge on the probabil-
ity distribution pζωnm with n,m ∈ N, where N is the set of
the non-negative integers. Again, this estimation can be
done analytically or numerically, and for simplicity here
we use the analytical approach introduced in Ref. [65].
For completeness, below we include the expressions for
Y Z11,L and e
X
11,U :
Y Z11,L ≥
1
(µs − ν2)2(ν1 − ν2)2(µs − ν1)2
×[(µ2s − ν22)(µs − ν2)(Gν1ν1Z e2ν1 +Gν2ν2Z e2ν2
−Gν1ν2Z eν1+ν2)− (ν21 − ν22)(ν1 − ν2)(GµsµsZ e2µs
+Gν2ν2Z e
2ν2 −Gµsν2Z eµs+ν2 −Gν2µsZ eν2+µs)], (7)
and
eX11,U ≤
1
(ν1 − ν2)2Y X11,L
(e2ν1Gν1ν1X E
ν1ν1
X + e
2ν2Gν2ν2X
×Eν2ν2X − eν1+ν2Gν1ν2X Eν1ν2X − eν2+ν1Gν2ν1X
×Eν2ν1X ), (8)
where Y X11,L represents a lower bound on the yield associ-
ated to those single-photon events emitted by Alice and
Bob in the X basis. This last quantity can be estimated
using Eq. (7) but now referred to the X basis.
To evaluate RL in the presence of a laser seeding at-
tack we follow a methodology similar to that used in the
previous subsection, and we omit it here for simplicity.
Also, to evaluate an upper bound RU on the secret key
rate, we extend the technique introduced in Ref. [64] to
the case of MDI-QKD. Here, for simplicity, we consider
that Alice and Bob only distill secret key from nonposi-
tive partial transposed entangled states [66, 67], i.e., we
disregard the key material which could be obtained from
positive partial transposed entangled states [68]. We re-
fer the reader to Appendix D for further details about
the upper bound RU .
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FIG. 6. Lower (RL) and upper (RU ) bounds on the secret
key rate as a function of the distance for MDI-QKD with
WCPs for three different values of the multiplicative factor
κ = {1, 1.5, 2.5}. The correct value of RL in the presence
of the attack is zero when κ = 2.5. This shows that Alice
and Bob significantly overestimate the secret key rate in the
presence of the attack. The original intensity settings have
been optimized previously for each distance for the case where
there is no attack. The parameters used in the simulations
are given in Table I.
For simulation purposes, we use again the experimen-
tal parameters given in Table I. For simplicity, we as-
sume that Eve performs a symmetric attack in which she
injects light of the same intensity into both Alice’s and
Bob’s transmitter devices, which moreover we assume are
identical. The resulting lower and upper bounds on the
secret key rate are shown in Fig. 6. For this example
we consider three possible values for the multiplicative
factor κ = {1, 1.5, 2.5}. The case κ = 1 corresponds to
the scenario without attack. The results are analogous
to those illustrated in Fig. 4. In particular, the incor-
rect value of RL that Alice and Bob would estimate in
the presence of the attack is well above the correct value
of RL delivered by a proper application of the security
proof (i.e., for the case where one considers the correct
values of the output intensities modified by the attack).
This is particularly critical for the case where κ = 2.5,
as the security proof provides no secure key rate in this
scenario while Alice and Bob would incorrectly estimate
a relatively high value for RL. Also, in this case, the up-
per bound RU is below the estimated RL for all distances
(see Fig. 6).
V. DISCUSSION AND COUNTERMEASURE
In this laser seeding attack, the isolation present in a
real QKD system may significantly affect Eve’s injection
power. Thus, we should analyse this effect in detail. The
7first factor that contributes to such isolation is the pres-
ence of an attenuator to attenuate Alice’s signals to the
single-photon level. If we assume that the power of Al-
ice’s laser is similar to the laser we tested, the required
attenuation would be in the order of 60 dB to obtain
single-photon-level pulses. This means that Eve’s ini-
tial injection laser (before going through the attenuator)
should be in the order of 100 mW (assuming that there is
no internal isolator in the laser) such that about 100 nW
power can enter the laser cavity. This value is reason-
able and can be safely transmitted through optical fiber,
which confirms that the laser seeding attack is practical.
Furthermore, we note that the attenuation provided
by optical attenuators can be decreased via a laser dam-
age attack [24]. Specifically, Eve can illuminate Alice’s
attenuator with a c.w. laser with power of several watts.
The experimental results reported in [24] show that it
is possible to permanently decrease the attenuation by
more than 10 dB by the c.w. laser. Importantly, this
can be done such that no connector or other compo-
nents in the experiment are damaged. The attenuator
is the only component that responds. Therefore, if Eve
applies first the laser damage attack against the atten-
uators to decrease their attenuation, then the injection
power of the laser seeding attack could be even lower than
100 mW. This strategy of combination attacks makes
the laser seeding attack easier to implement thanks to
the laser damage attack.
The second factor that could contribute to have more
isolation is to include an external isolator. The isolator
indeed makes Eve’s attack more difficult. However, ac-
cording to the working mechanism of an optical isolator,
the isolation of the backward injection light is due to the
polarization rotation inside the isolator, after which the
rotated light is extinguished. The rotation is realized by
a magneto-optic effect. It is notable that the magnets
used in isolators are temperature-dependent [69]. That
is, the higher temperature, the smaller rotation. Thus,
the temperature is an important factor in practice to de-
termine the real isolation value. From Eve’s point of
view, she may somehow hack the isolator by increasing
the temperature. The quantitative study of the depen-
dence between the optical isolation provided by an op-
tical isolator and the temperature that Eve can achieve
is beyond the scope of this paper, but we’ve studied this
topic in another manuscript [70].
It is clear that for a given power of Eve’s injected light,
the more effective isolation the users’ transmitters have,
the smaller the value of the multiplicative factor κ will be,
and thus also the effectiveness of the attack. For example,
according to Fig. 3, if the power of Eve’s injected light
is say 10 W, then an effective isolation > 80 dB would
result in a multiplicative factor κ < 2 for ID300 sample 2.
Importantly, however, as we have seen in Fig. 5, whenever
κ > 1 (which in principle might happen even for very
high isolation), Alice and Bob might always overestimate
their secret key rate, unless, of course, they modify their
security analysis to properly incorporate the effect of the
laser seeding attack.
For this, for instance, Alice and Bob could first bound
the power of Eve’s injected light to a reasonable value,
as done for example in Refs. [24, 48–50]. With this as-
sumption in place, and for a given value of the isolation
of their transmitters, as well as the behaviour of their
laser sources, Alice and Bob could in principle upper
bound the maximum value, κmax, that the parameter κ
can take. In so doing, and for given observed experimen-
tal data (i.e., gains and error rates associated to different
values of the intensity settings), they could simply mini-
mize their secret key rate by taking into account that now
the intensities of the emitted light pulses might lay in an
interval [µ, κmaxµ], where µ is the value of the original
intensity setting. This way Alice and Bob consider the
worst-case scenario and can guarantee that the resulting
secret key rate is indeed secure.
Another alternative for Alice to determine the param-
eter κmax might be to use an incoming-light monitor to
detect the injection light. The main drawback of this
approach is, however, that the classical monitor that de-
tects the injected light is not a reliable device. For ex-
ample, in Ref. [71], it has been shown that the classical
monitor can be bypassed by Eve’s pulses with high rep-
etition rate, and thus the classical monitor cannot cor-
rectly quantify the amount of injected light. This is due
to the limited bandwidth of the classical monitor. Fur-
thermore, the classical monitor may even be damaged by
Eve’s light [22]. According to the experimental results in
Ref. [22], the classical monitor is the first component in
Alice that is damaged by Eve’s laser. Therefore, the clas-
sical detector also may not be a reliable countermeasure
to prevent Eve’s injection of light.
In practice, it is important to note as well that Eve
could in principle combine the laser seeding attack with
various attacks to enhance her hacking capability, for ex-
ample, with the laser damage attack [22, 24] as mentioned
above, with the THA analysed in Refs. [48–50, 53, 72, 73],
and/or with the recently introduced injection-locking at-
tack [59]. For instance, Eve could employ the fact that
the laser seeding can be affected in real time by the state
of Alice’s modulator, changing the laser wavelength de-
pending on the modulator setting [59] and/or modulating
the intensity multiplication factor κ. Besides using her
injected light to modify the internal functioning of the
transmitter (as done in the laser seeding attack), Eve
could also simultaneously perform a THA and measure
the back-reflected light to obtain information about the
transmitter’s settings for each emitted light pulse. This
means that to properly evaluate the security of a QKD
system, one should probably combine the techniques de-
scribed in the previous paragraphs with the security anal-
ysis introduced in Refs. [48–50, 53].
8VI. CONCLUSION
This study has experimentally demonstrated that the
laser seeding attack is able to increase the intensity of the
light emitted by the laser diode used in a QKD system,
breaking the fundamental assumption about the mean
photon number of a QKD protocol. Moreover, we have
shown theoretically that such increase of the intensity
might seriously compromise the security of QKD imple-
mentations. For this, we have considered two prominent
examples: the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol and
MDI-QKD, both implemented with phase-randomized
WCPs. In both cases, we have demonstrated that, in
the presence of the attack, the legitimate users of the
system might significantly overestimate the secret key
rate provided by proper security proofs, even well above
known upper bounds. This theoretical security analysis
can be applied to any attack that increases the intensity
of the emitted pulses. For instance, a laser damage at-
tack against the optical attenuators also shows that Eve
can increase the intensity of Alice’s pulses by decreasing
the attenuation provided by the attenuators [24].
Although MDI-QKD is immune to all detector side-
channel attacks, our work shows Eve’s capability of hack-
ing the source of a QKD system and highlights that fur-
ther research is needed to protect the system against
source side-channel attacks. Moreover, we remark that
the laser seeding attack may compromise as well the se-
curity of other quantum decoy-state based cryptographic
systems beyond QKD, like, for instance, various two-
party protocols with practical signals [74], quantum dig-
ital signatures [75, 76], and blind quantum comput-
ing [77, 78].
While preparing this Article for publication, we have
learned of another laser seeding experiment that changes
the wavelength of Alice’s laser rather than its inten-
sity [59].
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Appendix A: Laser seeding by different wavelengths
In the laser seeding attack, we pick the wavelength of
the injected light to obtain the maximum energy of Al-
ice’s optical pulses. At this wavelength, we observe the
increased energy and the longer tail, as shown in Fig. 2.
Moreover, we have tested the injected light with slightly
different wavelengths that are still in the wavelength
range of the laser diode from the high-speed oscilloscope,
see Fig. 7. Sample 1 of ID300 with 1 nm linewidth
is shown as an example. When 2 mW power is in-
jected into the laser, different wavelengths result in dif-
ferent waveforms. At 1550.15 nm, Alice’s pulse has the
highest energy but relatively lower peak power. When
the wavelength is slightly off the center wavelength, at
1549.98 nm, the peak power becomes higher, however the
tail is lower. This trend continues when the wavelength
is shifted further to 1549.76 nm.
Appendix B: Decoy-state QKD protocol
In decoy-state QKD, the transmitter emits quantum
states that are diagonal in the Fock basis, and whose
mean photon number is selected at random, within a
predefined set of possible values, for each output sig-
nal. These states are typically generated with an attenu-
ated laser diode emitting phase-randomized weak coher-
ent pulses (WCPs) in combination with a variable atten-
uator to set the intensity of each individual light pulse.
In particular, let Y αn (e
α
n) denote the n-photon yield
(error rate) in the polarization basis α ∈ {Z,X}. That
is, Y αn (e
α
n) represents the probability that an n-photon
state prepared in the α basis generates a detection click
(a detection click associated to an error in the α basis) at
Bob’s side. For each intensity setting µ, these quantities
are related to the overall experimentally observed gain,
Gµα, and to the overall experimentally observed error rate,
Eµα, in the α basis as follows:
Gµα =
∑
n
pµnY
α
n ,
Eµα =
1
Gµα
∑
n
pµne
α
nY
α
n ,
(B1)
where pµn denotes the probability that Alice emits an n-
photon state when she selects the intensity setting µ. In
the case of WCPs, these probabilities follow a Poissonian
distribution, pµn = e
−µµn/n!, that only depends on the
mean photon number µ. That is, Gµα (E
µ
α) represents
the probability that a WCP of intensity µ prepared in
the α basis generates a detection click (a detection click
associated to an error in the α basis) at Bob’s side.
Importantly, Eq. (B1) relates the observed quantities
Gµα and E
µ
α with the unknown parameters Y
α
n and e
α
n
through the known probabilities pµn. This means, in par-
ticular, that by solving the set of linear equations given
by Eq. (B1) for different values of µ one can obtain tight
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FIG. 7. Averaged waveforms of the laser pulses measured
from ID300 sample 1 with 2 mW tampering power for different
wavelengths. Each oscillogram is an average over 2000 pulses.
bounds on the relevant parameters Y Z1 and e
X
1 which are
required to determine the resulting secret key rate.
Now suppose that Eve performs a laser seeding attack
that increases the output intensity of the emitted pulses
from µ to say µ′. In this scenario, Alice and Bob, who
are unaware of the attack, would use the experimentally
observed quantities Gµ
′
α and E
µ′
α , which depend on the
modified mean photon number µ′, together with the orig-
inal (but now erroneous) probabilities pµn that depend on
the original intensity µ, to estimate the parameters Y Z1
and eX1 . That is, if Eve implements a laser seeding at-
tack, Alice and Bob would use the following set of linear
equations to estimate Y Z1 and e
X
1 :
Gµ
′
α =
∑
n
pµnY
α
n ,
Eµ
′
α =
1
Gµ
′
α
∑
n
pµne
α
nY
α
n .
(B2)
In so doing, the bounds obtained for Y Z1 and e
X
1 by solv-
ing Eq. (B2) are not guaranteed to be correct bounds
for the single-photon yield in the Z basis nor for the
phase error rate. Indeed, the correct bounds for these
two quantities satisfy Eq. (B1) after substituting µ with
µ′.
Appendix C: Upper bound RU for decoy-state QKD
Here we briefly summarize the technique introduced
in Ref. [64] to derive an upper bound on the secret key
rate for a decoy-state QKD protocol. It basically consists
in finding the best separable approximation (BSA) [79]
among all bipartite quantum states that are compatible
with the measurement results observed by Alice and Bob
in an execution of the protocol. That is, these are the
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states that Alice and Bob could have shared in a virtual
entanglement protocol that is equivalent to the actual
protocol. For simplicity, Ref. [64] considers a decoy-state
protocol where Alice and Bob use an infinite number of
decoy settings. Note, however, that in the asymptotic
limit where Alice sends Bob an infinite number of signals,
an upper bound on the secret key rate for this protocol
applies as well to a protocol using a finite number of
decoy settings. We follow the same procedure here.
In particular, let Sn denote the set of all bipartite
quantum states, σnAB , which are compatible with Alice
and Bob’s measurement results in a virtual entanglement
protocol that is equivalent to the actual protocol when
Alice sends Bob an n-photon signal. That is, this set is
defined as
Sn = {σnAB |Tr[Ak ⊗BjσnAB ] = pnkj ∀k, j}, (C1)
where {Ak}k and {Bj}j are the measurement operators
of Alice and Bob in the virtual entanglement protocol,
and pnkj represent the measured statistics associated to
the n-photon signals emitted by Alice. Since we assume
that Alice uses an infinite number of decoy intensities,
we consider that she can estimate these probabilities pre-
cisely.
The states σnAB ∈ Sn can always be expressed as a con-
vex sum of one separable state, σnsep, and one entangled
state, ρnent, as follows
σnAB = λnσ
n
sep + (1− λn)ρnent, (C2)
for some real parameter λn ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the BSA of
the states in Sn corresponds to that state with the maxi-
mum value of the parameter λn, which we shall denote by
λnBSA. That is, for every n, we want to find the parameter
λnBSA = max[λn|σnAB ∈ Sn], (C3)
as well as the corresponding entangled state ρnent for the
BSA.
In standard decoy-state QKD with four sending states,
Alice’s measurement operators {Ak}k can be described
by a projective measurement in a four-dimensional
Hilbert space, i.e., Ak = |k〉〈k| with k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Each operator Ak is associated with Alice sending one
of the four possible polarization states of the BB84 pro-
tocol. On Bob’s side, his measurement operators {Bj}j
correspond to a positive-operator valued measurement
(POVM) with the following elements
B0 =
1
2
|0〉〈0| , B1 = 1
2
|1〉〈1| ,
B± =
1
2
|±〉〈±| , Bvac = |vac〉〈vac| , (C4)
where |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉±|1〉), and |vac〉 is the vacuum state.
As already mentioned in the main text, here we implicitly
assume that double click events are randomly assigned by
Bob to single click events.
In addition, we have that in a prepare&measure QKD
scheme the reduced density matrix of Alice, ρnA =
TrB(σ
n
AB), is fixed by her state preparation process. In
the scenario considered, it turns out that ρnA can be writ-
ten as [64]
ρnA =
1
4

1 0 2−n/2 2−n/2
0 1 2−n/2 (−1)n2−n/2
2−n/2 2−n/2 1 0
2−n/2 (−1)n2−n/2 0 1
 .
(C5)
Putting all the conditions together, one can obtain the
parameter λnBSA and the corresponding entangled state
ρnent, for each n, by solving the following semidefinite pro-
gram (SDP) [64]
min 1− Tr(σnsep(x)),
s.t. σnAB(x) ≥ 0,
Tr[σnAB(x)] = 1,
Tr[Ak ⊗BjσnAB(x)] = pnkj ,∀k, j,
TrB(σ
n
AB(x)) = ρ
n
A,
σnsep(x) ≥ 0,
σn,Γsep (x) ≥ 0,
σnAB(x)− σnsep(x) ≥ 0, (C6)
where the vector x is used to parametrize the density
operators and Γ denotes partial transposition of one of
the subsystems. Note that in Eq. (C6) the state σnsep(x)
represents an unnormalized state, i.e., if we compare this
state with that given in Eq. (C2) we have that σnsep(x) =
λnσ
n
sep.
From the optimal solution, xsol, of the SDP above we
have that
λnBSA = Tr
(
σnsep(xsol)
)
,
ρnent =
σnAB(xsol)− σnsep(xsol)
1− λnBSA
. (C7)
The upper bound on the secret key rate can then be
written as [64, 80]
RU ≤
∑
n≥1
rn(1− λnBSA)Ientn (A;B), (C8)
where rn ≈ e−µµn/n! is the probability that Alice sends
Bob an n-photon state, where µ is the mean photon num-
ber of the signal, and Ientn (A;B) is the Shannon mutual
information evaluated on qnkj = Tr(Ak ⊗ Bjρnent). Note
that to calculate Eq. (C8) it is typically sufficient to con-
sider only a finite number of terms in the summation,
because of the limit imposed by the unambiguous state
discrimination attack. See Ref. [64] for further details.
Appendix D: Upper bound RU for MDI-QKD
Here we extend the results in Ref. [64] to the MDI-
QKD framework to calculate an upper bound on the
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secure key rate coming, for simplicity, from nonposi-
tive partial transposed entangled states [66, 67]. Like
in Ref. [64], we consider for simplicity that Alice and
Bob use an infinite number of decoy settings (see also
Appendix C).
In MDI-QKD, both Alice and Bob are transmitters
while, in the middle, an untrusted third party Charles
is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement on
the incoming signals and publicity announce the result.
Let c ∈ San denote Charles’ announcement, where San
is the set of all possible announcements. This set in-
cludes the possible Bell states that Charles can obtain
with his measurement as well as the inconclusive event.
For each announcement c, we will denote the set of bi-
partite quantum states, σnmAB,c, that Alice and Bob could
have shared in an equivalent virtual entanglement proto-
col (given that in the actual protocol they sent n and m
photons to Charles, respectively) as Snmc . That is, S
nm
c
contains all the bipartite quantum states σnmAB,c that are
compatible with Alice and Bob’s measurement outcomes
in the equivalent virtual entanglement protocol,
Snmc = {σnmAB,c|Tr
[
Ak ⊗BjσnmAB,c
]
= pnmckj ∀k, j}, (D1)
where {Ak}k and {Bj}j are the measurement operators
of Alice and Bob in the virtual entanglement protocol,
and pnmckj represent the measured statistics associated to
Charles’ announcement c when Alice (Bob) sends him
an n-photon (m-photon) signal. In the same way as in
Appendix C, here it is assumed that Alice and Bob can
estimate the probabilities pnmckj precisely because they use
an infinite number of decoy intensities.
Similar to the case of the standard decoy-state BB84
protocol considered previously, we have that the states
σnmAB,c ∈ Snmc can always be decomposed as the convex
sum of a separable state, σnmsep,c, and an entangled state,
ρnment,c, as follows
σnmAB,c = λ
c
nmσ
nm
sep,c + (1− λcnm)ρnment,c, (D2)
for some real parameter λcnm ∈ [0, 1].
Now we follow the technique introduced in Ref. [64]
(see also Appendix C). In particular, for each pair of
values n and m, we search for the parameter λcnm (which
we shall call λnmcBSA) and the entangled state ρ
nm
ent,c which
correspond to the BSA of the states σnmAB,c ∈ Snmc . That
is,
λnmcBSA = max{λcnm|σnmAB,c ∈ Snmc }. (D3)
Then we have that the secret key rate is upper bounded
by
RU ≤
∑
c∈San
∑
n,m≥1
pc|nmrnm(1−λnmcBSA)Ientnm,c(A;B), (D4)
where pc|nm is the conditional probability that Charles
announces c given that Alice (Bob) sends him an n-
photon (m-photon) state, rnm ≈ e−2µµn+m/(n!m!) is the
probability that Alice and Bob send Charles an n-photon
state and an m-photon state, respectively, where µ is the
mean photon number of their WCPs, and Ientnm,c(A;B) is
the Shannon mutual information calculated on the statis-
tics qnmckj = Tr
(
Ak ⊗Bjρnment,c
)
, with ρnment,c being the en-
tanglement part of the BSA of the states σnmAB,c ∈ Snmc .
To calculate λnmcBSA and the corresponding entangled
state ρnment,c for the BSA we use again SDP. For this,
note that Alice’s (Bob’s) measurement operators {Ak}k
({Bj}j) can be described by a projective measurement
in a four-dimensional Hilbert space, i.e., Ak = |k〉〈k|
(Bj = |j〉〈j|) with k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}). Each
operator Ak (Bj) is associated with Alice (Bob) sending
one of the four possible polarization states of the BB84
protocol to Charles.
In addition, and similar to the case of Appendix C,
we have that both the reduced density matrices of Al-
ice and Bob are fixed by their state preparation pro-
cesses. More precisely, ρnmA = TrB(σ
nm
AB) and ρ
nm
B =
TrA(σ
nm
AB) are both equal to Eq. (C5), where σ
nm
AB =∑
c∈San pc|nmσ
nm
AB,c. In fact, in this case, these conditions
can even be generalized to σnmAB = ρ
n
A ⊗ ρmB .
Putting all the conditions together, one can obtain the
parameter λnmcBSA and the corresponding entangled state
ρnment,c, for each n, m and c, by solving the following SDP,
min 1− Tr(σnmsep,c(x)),
s.t. σnmAB,t(x) ≥ 0 ∀t ∈ San,
Tr
[
σnmAB,t(x)
]
= 1 ∀t ∈ San,
Tr
[
Ak ⊗BjσnmAB,t(x)
]
= pnmtkj ,∀k, j,∀t ∈ San∑
t∈San
pt|nmσnmAB,t(x) = ρ
n
A ⊗ ρmB ,
σnmsep,c(x) ≥ 0,
σnm,Γsep,c (x) ≥ 0,
σnmAB,c(x)− σnmsep,c(x) ≥ 0, (D5)
where, as mentioned previously, we disregard for simplic-
ity the secret key coming from positive partial transposed
entangled states [68] by neglecting in Eq. (D5) the key
material provided by those states σnmsep,c(x) that satisfy
σnm,Γsep,c (x) ≥ 0. A general but computationally more de-
manding method that considers also the key provided
by positive partial transposed entangled states has been
proposed, for instance, in Ref. [80]. Let xsol denote the
solution given by the SDP in Eq. (D5), then
λnmcBSA = Tr
(
σnmsep,c(xsol)
)
,
ρnment,c =
σnmAB,c(xsol)− σnmsep,c(xsol)
1− λnmcBSA
. (D6)
